【News】Korea’s Civil Society Supporting “Coal Phase-Out”


During COP30 in November 2025, South Korea officially announced to join the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), signaling a firm commitment to a future free from reliance on coal-fired power generation. This marks a significant policy pivot for a nation that, much like Japan, had previously sought to extend the lifespan of coal-fired power plants through technologies such as ammonia co-firing.

What drove this dramatic shift? The answer lies in the persistent and strategic mobilization of South Korean civil society. This article explores the movements that reshaped the nation’s climate agenda, based on insights from Sejong Youn (Plan 1.5) and Sehee Jeong (Solutions for Our Climate – SFOC), who presented at a December 2024 webinar hosted by Kiko Network.

Leveraging the Constitutional Court’s “Unconstitutional” Ruling for a Stronger 2035 NDC

A Landmark Ruling for Future Generations
“Infringement on the Rights of Future Generations”

In August 2024, South Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that the government’s climate measures (the Carbon Neutrality Act) were unconstitutional in that they failed to set greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets for 2030 and beyond, thereby infringing on the rights of future generations to a safe and healthy environment. The court clearly stated that “reduction targets must be based on scientific facts and in accordance with international standards.” Due to this historic” unconstitutional ruling,” the National Assembly is now obligated to revise the Carbon Neutrality Act until February 2026.

Making “65% Reduction by 2035” the Social Slogan

Civil society did not miss this opportunity, as the government could no longer ignore the Constitutional Court’s ruling during discussions on the 2035 NDC to be submitted to the United Nations. Under the common banner of a “65% reduction by 2035″—a specific figure aligned with the 1.5°C goal and considering South Korea’s responsibility as a developed nation—over 140 organizations collaborated to launch a large-scale campaign. In addition to submitting requests to the new administration, they believed that public support was necessary for political decisions. Through activities such as media and SNS outreach, large billboard advertisements, and massive climate marches, they broadened the understanding of what an NDC is and increased support for setting the emission reduction target at 65%.

Around the same time, five bills related to the “Carbon Neutrality Act” were introduced in the South Korean National Assembly. All of these bills set 2035 reduction targets higher than those proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); notably, two of these bills incorporated the 65% reduction demanded by civil society. This indicates that the requests of civil society had reached at least some members of the National Assembly.

In September 2025, the government began discussions on the NDC. Although the NDC showing the 2035 target was required to be submitted to the UN by the end of September 2025, it should have been based on the emission reduction targets set by the National Assembly. Civil society filed a legal challenge against the government’s proceeding with NDC discussions beforehand, but the appeal was rejected, and the NDC discussions moved forward.

The initial options for the 2035 emission reduction target presented by the Minister of Climate, Energy and Environment were: 48% (“Realistic” scenario), 53% (linear path from the current situation), 61% (IPCC-indicated level), and 65% (reflecting South Korea’s responsibility as a developed nation). While it was heartening that the 65% scenario demanded by civil society was officially presented by the government for the first time alongside the IPCC’s 61% scenario, the inclusion of the 48% scenario—which would effectively loosen the initial reduction target—was out of the question.

Since September, several public consultation seminars and open discussions with various sectors have been held. However, industry representatives focused solely on the difficulty and cost of greenhouse gas reductions, and there was almost no discussion regarding the impacts of climate change or the burden on future generations.

Outcomes and Challenges of the Discussion

The 2035 NDC announced by the South Korean government at COP30, held in Brazil in November, was presented as a range of “53–61%.” This fell short of the 65% requested by civil society, and challenges remain, as focus is still being placed on the lower end of 53%. However, without the Constitutional Court’s ruling and civil society’s efforts, the target might have remained around 48%. The fact that the 61% figure was included as a formal option is a significant achievement of climate litigation and citizen movements.

South Korea’s Emissions Trading System (K-ETS)

South Korea’s Emissions Trading System (K-ETS) has already been in operation for ten years. It covers 73% of South Korea’s total emissions, but it also faces challenges such as carbon prices being too low. K-ETS is a cap-and-trade mechanism, and since total emissions are limited by the national emission reduction target (NDC), it is ineffective if the NDC is low. Because South Korea’s NDC has been low, industries such as steel and petrochemicals, which received excessive emission quotas, earned as much as $400 million in profit by selling their surplus quotas. Another issue was that most of the industrial sector was given emission quotas for free, which provided no incentive for emission reduction. The government recognizes the problems with K-ETS, and it is expected that slight improvements, such as a reduction in emission quotas and an increase in carbon prices, will be made in the fourth phase starting in 2026. Through various efforts including this system, South Korea is expected to move forward with emission reductions toward higher goals.

Coal Phase-Out Driven by Subnational Government

Pressure from the Subnational Governments

The coal phase-out in South Korea began not with the central government, but with subnational governments such as Chungcheongnam-do, which in 2018 became the first subnational government in Asia to join the PPCA. About half of South Korea’s coal-fired power plants are concentrated in Chungcheongnam-do, which faces the contradiction of paying high environmental and social costs. In 2019, the year after joining the PPCA, Chungcheongnam-do was the first local government in East Asia to declare a Climate Emergency and announced carbon neutrality by 2050, one year ahead of the national government. Since then, Chungcheongnam-do has continued its efforts toward coal phase-out by holding annual conferences. These conferences attract participants from both domestic and international locations, leading the national climate policy debate through active discussions and the introduction of local case studies.

Following Chungcheongnam-do, seven more subnational governments joined the PPCA. The coal-fired power plants located in these seven municipalities account for 80% of the coal-fired power in South Korea. The fact that these local movements reached such a scale became powerful pressure that ultimately moved the central government.

Bringing International Coal Phase-Out Move into the Domestic Level

International pressure also supported South Korea’s decision to phase out coal. At COP23 (2017, Germany), where the PPCA was launched, no one mentioned coal-fired power in the plenary session. However, by COP26 (2021, UK), coal-fired power became an unavoidable political topic, and an agreement was reached on the phase-down of unabated coal power. Although an agreement on the “phase-out” of coal-fired power was not reached due to opposition from some countries, it is certain that coal power became a central theme. At that time, the South Korean government faced pressure from domestic local governments and climate ambassadors from various countries to join the PPCA. In 2021, South Korea restricted public financing for overseas coal-fired power plants.

While the South Korean government has been repeatedly urged by local governments and the international community to aim for a coal phase-out, the pressure from home and abroad—and the fact that civil society spread these movements as a message—has accelerated the domestic movement toward coal phase-out.

Future Movements — Toward a “Just Transition”

To realize a “Just Transition” in the early retirement of coal-fired power, specific discussions on finance, such as estimating the costs associated with the transition, are also important. Support (transition finance) for retirement is necessary for coal-fired power plants with relatively short operation periods (20 units that will have been in operation for less than 20 years by 2030). The South Korean civil society organization SFOC estimates that $1.3 billion in transition finance is needed to retire all domestic coal-fired power plants by 2035, and $4.9 billion is needed to retire them by 2030.

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The case of South Korea proves that when three elements—”judicial judgment (on the climate litigation),” “pioneering movements by local governments,” and “citizen solidarity based on scientific evidence”—come together, even conservative energy policies can be moved dramatically. Furthermore, South Korean civil society groups have expanded their scope from “Korea Beyond Coal” to the “Korea Beyond Fossil Fuel” campaign, making strategic recommendations to prevent the “gutting of decarbonization” such as easy conversion to natural gas or ammonia co-firing, in addition to calling for the retirement of coal-fired power. For Japan, where discussions over ammonia co-firing and the maintenance of coal-fired power continue, this process followed by South Korean civil society will serve as an extremely important guideline in reviewing future emission reduction targets and drawing a roadmap for coal phase-out.

For those who want to know more about the efforts of South Korean civil society:
The Kiko Network website features the archived video of the webinar. If you would like to know more about how civil society pushed South Korea toward coal phase-out, please watch the video (with English-Japanese interpretation).
【Webinar】Behind South Korea’s Shift Toward “Coal Phase-Out” – How Civil Society Pushed the Government to Enhance its NDC and Join the PPCA (23 December, 2025) (Link) 

Related Info.
【News】S.Korea joins the “PPCA” signaling its commitment to phase out coal (Link)