On December 25, 2024, the Subcommittee on Basic Policy (68th meeting) of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy compiled the secretariat’s draft of the 7th Strategic Energy Plan and reference values for energy supply and supply and demand forecasts for FY2040. The Strategic Energy Plan functions as a framework for Japan’s energy policy and is revised every three years in accordance with the Basic Act on Energy Policy. The draft plan does not indicate any sort of exit from coal and maintains high nuclear and thermal power generation targets even in 2040. Think tanks and NGOs have issued statements and opinions criticizing the draft plan as completely inadequate to limiting the temperature rise to 1.5°C.

Japan’s Energy Supply and Demand in 2040

The government predicts that electricity demand in FY2040 will have increased from the current level (985.4 billion kWh in 2023) to around 1.1-1.2 trillion kWh. The following figure shows the future power source mix used to meet demand for the projected energy increase.

Problem 1: Energy mix will continue thermal and nuclear generation

The biggest issue with the new Strategic Energy Plan is that thermal power will be 30-40% of Japan’s energy mix in 2040, which is inconsistent with the 1.5°C target demanded by the rest of the world. The government also states that it will continue to use nuclear power to the maximum extent possible and set it to around 20% in 2040, a target that will be exceedingly difficult to achieve. If nuclear power is not able to supply electricity as expected, thermal power will have to be used to cover the cost, and the ratio of thermal power will increase.

Under the reduction pathway of limiting warming to 1.5°C as indicated in the IPCC 6th Assessment Synthesis Report, it is necessary to decarbonize the electricity sector by 2035. However, with this electricity mix it will not only become impossible to achieve reductions in line with the IPCC pathway, but also put Japan’s 2050 net zero goal in jeopardy.

<Issues with each power source>

• Renewable Energy
  Although the energy mix states that “renewable energy will be introduced to the maximum extent possible as the main power source,” the phrase “under the principle of highest priority” from the 6th Strategic Energy Plan was removed. The planned share of renewable energy in 2040 is only 40-50%, with the share of wind power relatively low. This is despite the recent advancements made in developing and implementing innovative technologies such as perovskite solar cells and floating offshore wind power.
• Nuclear Power
  The phrase “reducing dependence on nuclear power,” which had been included since the 4th Strategic Energy Plan (drafted after the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station) was removed. Positioning nuclear power as a major decarbonized power source to meet new electricity demand for data centers, semiconductor manufacturers, etc., the government has set an unrealistic target of about 20% nuclear power in 2040. It is clear that Japan will actively promote the building and research and development of next-generation advanced reactors in aiming for “maximum utilization of nuclear energy.”
• Thermal Power
  The previous 6th Strategic Energy Plan divided the share of thermal power into 19% coal, 20% LNG, 2% oil, and 1% hydrogen in 2030, but the new 2040 energy mix only indicates about 30% to 40% for thermal power, without a breakdown of the fuel sources. Even though a concrete target for coal is not provided, it is clear that Japan is not aiming to phase-out coal as it committed to as a G7 member. Similarly, there is no specific target given regarding LNG, which has been steadily increasing over the past few years, and to what extent high-cost hydrogen/ammonia co-firing will be utilized.

Problem 2: Maintaining reliance on thermal power

Behind the Japanese government’s insistence that it is “on track” toward its greenhouse gas reduction targets while maintaining 30-40% thermal power, there are unrealistic expectations for so-called “zero-emission thermal power” and carbon capture and storage (CCS). When the 6th Strategic Energy Plan set 1% hydrogen and ammonia in the 2030 energy mix, the government presented a target of 30% hydrogen co-firing or mono-firing for gas-fired power plants and 20% ammonia co-firing for coal-fired power plants by 2030. Although co-firing experimental testing is underway, no concrete plan has been put forth for how many thermal power plants will be replaced by co-firing by 2040. Regarding CCS, the government is planning to transport CO2 that cannot be processed domestically to overseas for storage. Continuing to use thermal power on the premise that CCS will become available and CO2 will be stored in other countries is simply irresponsible.

Japan is trying to maintain reliance on thermal power by placing excessive and unrealistic expectations on premature technologies that have yet to be commercialized, such as co-firing and CCS. The amount of emissions reduced by utilizing these technologies in the future is uncertain, so in order to ensure emission reductions, Japan should instead be steadily promoting renewable energy, for which the technology is well-established, affordable, and effective.

Problem 3: Untransparent political processes

Since it has a significant impact not only on the economy, but also on daily life in Japan, it is important that the Strategic Energy Plan be discussed and developed through a democratic and transparent process. The draft Energy Plan emphasizes “transparency and policy-making process and enhancement of interactive communications”, as well as “to maximize openness of the policy-making process through committees/councils and enhance transparency.” However, very important decisions have been decided in a process that cannot be called transparent. Many have called into question the process of coming up with the figures in a top-down fashion, without obtaining input from the public.

While the rest of the world is rapidly transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy, aiming for a 40-50% share of renewable energy in FY2040, 10-years later from the 36-38% in FY2030 target in the 6th Strategic Energy Plan, is far too low. Such a low percentage means Japan will not meaningfully contribute to the COP28 target of tripling the world’s renewable energy capacity by 2030. If Japan does not significantly reduce the share of thermal power and increase renewable energy by 2040, it will be regarded by the rest of the world as not being proactive in addressing global warming.

Some government council members also pointed out how public opinions are being ignored in the decision-making process for such an important plan. Before the public comment period for the 7th Strategic Energy Plan and others closed on January 26, NGOs and others called for people to submit public comments and held in-person and online seminars to point out the issues with the Energy Plan. As a result, over 40,000 opinions were submitted.

The Japanese government should publish all submitted opinions to the public in a timely manner, and decide the Strategic Energy Plan based on public discussion, rather than just holding token briefing sessions after the end of the comment submission period.

Reference

Renewable Energy Institute
Special Contents: Key Issues to Address in Japan’s Strategic Energy Plan
Climate Integrate: Report “Policy Making Process in Japan: Strategic Energy Plan as a Case Study”